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Nunley v. Daunt less (Cont.) 
claiming that his dewatering efforts were performed in an indi­
vidual capacity not as a representative of ChemLink. 
ISSUES: (I) Was Combi negligent in failing to conduct a good 
faith search for its barge prior to its decision to abandon if' 
(2) Is the Coast Guard entitled to recover for its 
marking expenses? 
( 3) Does Captain Nunley have a valid salvage claim"1 
A NA LYSIS: This court affirmed the district court and held 
that Combi used its best efforts to search for its sunken barge. 
The first day after the "barge breakaway" Combi joined the 
Coast Guard in a helicopter search. Subsequently it employed a 
skilled magnometer and fathometer reader to search under the 
water. The only option Combi did not employ was that of divers. 
However, river conditions were not conducive to a human 
search team. According to trial testimony, those river condi­
tions lasted well into the summer of 1974, months after the 
breakaway. 
As to the claim of abandonment by Combi, the district court 
noted that, "a valid abandonment occurs through the act of 
deserting the property without hope of recovery or intention of 
returning to it." In this case more than three years had elapsed 
since Combi ended its search and the Dauntless's accident. "In 
that interval Combi may safely be deemed to have abandoned 
the [Lash]." 
In February, 1974 Combi notified its insurers that it had failed to 
locate the barge and stated its intent to abandon it. "Since Combi 
was a non-negligent owner and had abandoned its vessel before 
the Dauntless collision . . . [Combi I was free from negligence. " 
The three prong test set out for determining a valid salvage 
claim includes "(2) voluntary service rendered when not re­
quired as an existing duty or from a special contract. " The 
Sabine, 101 U.S. 384 ( 1880). The district court found that 
Nunley's actions were not voluntary but rather were required 
by the contract ChemLink had entered into to supply tugs, 
pumps, and manpower to remove oil and water from the Dauntless. 
ChemLink's agreement contemplated that the efforts of Nunley 
would be utilized. As vice president he was often required to be on 
call 24 hours a day. Thus his claim to be working independently 
as a salvor, as opposed to working as per his contract, failed. 
The River and Harbor Act, 33 U.S.C. §409 (the Wreck Act), 
provides that, "when a vessel . . .  is wrecked and sunk . .  . 
accidentally or otherwise it shall be the duty of the owner . . .  to 
immediately mark it with a buoy or beacon." On January 30, 
197 4, the buoy that the Coast Guard had initially placed on the 
vessel was reported missing and the Coast Guard replaced it 
with a second larger buoy. Less than one month later the second 
buoy was reported missing. After the Dauntless's accident the 
Coast Guard maintained another buoy at the site of the wreck. 
Because the Coast Guard's first set of marking expenses was 
within three weeks of the sinking of Lash and at that time 
Combi was not considered to have abandoned it, the Coast 
Guard was entitled to recover for the first two markings. How­
ever, there is no recovery for the last buoy. By 1977 Combi had 
abandoned the sunken vessel. 
Melanie A .  Woo d '90 
STEPHE NSON v. Mc LEA N CO NTRACTI NG COMPA NY 
Unite d States Court of Appeals, Fourt h Circuit, 2 3  December 1988 
863F.2d 34 0 
An in divi dual injured w hile wor king on a crane barge to construct a bridge does not sustain his in jury from an 
unseawort hy vessel in navigable waters nor does he quali fy as a "seaman " under t he Jones Act . 
FACTS: Stephenson, the plaintiff-appellant was an employee 
of the McLean Contracting Company (McLeanJ which was 
building a bridge across the Choptank River in Maryland. He 
was assigned to the Annapolis, a crane barge being used as a 
plattorm to construct the bridge's support columns. He was 
injured March 26, 1986 while using a cutting torch on pilings in 
a cofferdam, a box-like structure designed to keep the river's 
water from the work area. Stephenson lost his tooting on some 
loose gravel, precipitating a fall to the bottom of the cofferdam, 
which was alongside another crane barge owned and used by 
McLean. The fall resulted in injuries for which he now sues. 
Stephenson brought this action in the United States District 
Court for the District of Maryland under the Jones Act, 46 
U.S.C. App. §688 (aJ, and the maritime doctrine of unseaworthi­
ness. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary 
judgment because Stephenson did not meet the definition of a 
··seaman·· as set forth in the three prong test of Whitting ham u. 
Sewer Construction Co. 541 F.2d 427 (4th Cir. 1976l and addition­
ally because the plaintiff was injured in the cofferdam which 
was not part of the vessel. The plaintiff appealed. 
ISSUE : Does a crane barge used as a platform to aid in the 
construction of a bridge constitute an "unseaworthy appurtenance 
of a vessel in navigable water·· which would allow recovery under 
the doctrine of unseaworthiness? 
A NA LYSIS: In affirming the dismissal, the Fourth Circuit 
examined the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. App. §688 (a), which provides: 
"Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course 
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of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action 
for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury . . . .  " 
The test the court of appeals used to determine if Stephenson 
met the definition of a "seaman" was first set out in Whittingham 
v. Sewer Construction Co. 541 F.2d at 436. There, the court 
determined under a three prong test that a worker must be a 
· permanently attached" crew member of a vessel in navigable 
waters to qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act. The court 
of appeals followed the district court's assumption that 
Stephenson was permanently attached to the Annapolis and 
that it was in navigation, satisfying the first prong of the Whit­
tingham test. Stephenson's duties in constructing the 
framework of the bridge such as welding and cutting pilings did 
not serve·· naturally and primarily as an aid to navigation" thus 
tailing to meet the second prong of the Whittingham test. The 
court found that the plaintiff as a bridge construction worker, in 
performing functions unrelated to the tasks of transportation, 
tailed to meet the test of a "seaman" as set forth in Whittingham. 
The court also determined that Stephenson's unseaworthiness 
claim did not present a genuine issue of material fact to go to the 
JUry. For recovery under the maritime doctrine of unseaworthi­
ness, the court again looked to Whittingham, where the plaintiff 
must show he was "doing the work of a seaman" and that his 
injury was caused by an "unseaworthy appurtenance of a vessel 
in navigable waters." Deciding that plaintiffs claim was without 
merit, the court concluded that Stephenson was a bridge con­
struction worker when injured, not a seaman, and also that he 
was not working on a vessel, but working on an independent 
work site, the cofferdam, when he was injured. 
Su zanne Remu zzi '90 
